diverse principles, and an
act is always proportioned to the thing of which it is an act, meaning a potency
which it actualizes. Every agent acts insofar as it is in act and every agent
produces its like. Every actualized essence must act insofar as it is in act,
must act substantially. The actuality of essence is esse and the
actuality of an operative potency is operation. Now we cannot equate the
essence of the human being with the soul's essence, since the human being is
essentially soul and body. Rather, the soul's essence is that by which a human
essence receives its esse. It is that by which the human being acts
substantially. The soul's essence is in act substantially together with the
matter it informs. The soul's essence must act insofar as it is in act, act as
the principle of esse for the entire human essence as long as the matter
it informs retains an adequate disposition to the form. Thus the soul's essence
is part of the "substantial plane." Operations occur on the "accidental plane,"
and if the soul's essence were the direct principle of particular actions, it
would no longer be acting insofar as it is in act. When Thomas posits this
axiom, he means that every agent must act insofar as it is in act, that
it must act on the metaphysical plane that it is on (substantial or
accidental). The adoption of the axiom "every agent produces its like" in this
case means that every agent produces its metaphysical like. So using his
esse-essentia distinction and an interpretation of two Aristotelian
principles, Thomas can show that the potencies of the soul must be really
distinct from the soul's essence, and the essence of every substance must be
distinct from its operative powers.
Thomas' second argument is
that the soul's potencies move one another, and so their acts cannot have one
identical immediate principle. It requires that Thomas assume the unicity of
form within the soul's essence. This means that the essence cannot move itself
from potency to act as an intellect moves the will or vice versa, because there
is no principle left to distinguish one part of the essence which is actual and
another which is potential, as every motion requires act and potency. Thus, if
the potencies were identical with the soul, no potency could ever move another,
which clearly goes against common experience. A similar problem would arise in
any creature with powers that move one another.
Thomas' third argument is
related to the first. The soul's essence can be called an act, and this for
three reasons. First, its very nature is to be the form of a body actualizing
the body. The soul has to be in act in order to carry this out. Second, as an
immaterial essence it is naturally immortal. Given that it is actualized by the
act-of-being, esse, it will always exist, because it contains no
principle of corruption. It is not an unqualified pure act, because it is still
in potency
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to non-existence, since it
depends on God's constant gift of esse. But while that gift is given,
the soul's essence is act. Thirdly, for Thomas the essence of the soul is a
form. But it is the very nature of form not to be a potency to another act
(given that the form is actualized through the esse) but to be the act of
something else. To posit the soul's essence as an immediate potency for the
operations of the soul is to make an actualized form, whose nature it is to
actualize another, a potency, which includes the potency to receive, going
against the very notion of form. This presumes not only Thomas' rejection of
universal hylomorphism but also his unicity of substantial form in the human
soul. Furthermore, because the soul's essence is act, if it were the immediate
principle of operation, it would always be operating. The soul does not
sometimes actualize the body while the human person is living, but always and at
every moment until the separation of body and soul in death. The only way to
escape this dilemma is to posit intermediary potencies as the immediate
principles of operations. A similar solution would be sought for the
metaphysical structures of at least some rational creatures.
Thomas integrates this
doctrine of created powers as distinct from the essence of the beings from which
they flow and in which they exist, especially his teaching on the rational
soul's powers as really distinct from the soul's essence, into his metaphysics
of the good. Operation is the end of finite substantial being. Second act is
the goal of first act, the purpose of substantial form actualizing a thing, and
therefore also the purpose of the substantial act of the esse. Thomas
expounds on this topic in DV:
"From the point of view of
its substantial goodness a thing is said to be good in a certain sense, but from
that of its accidental goodness it is said to be good without qualification.
Thus we do not call an unjust man good simply, but only in a certain
sense--inasmuch as he is a man. But a just man we call good without further
restriction. The reason for this difference is this. A thing is called a being
inasmuch as it is considered absolutely, but good, as has already been made
clear, in relation to other things. Now it is by its essential principles that
a thing is fully constituted in itself so that it subsists; but it is not so
perfectly constituted as to stand as it should in relation to everything outside
itself except by means of accidents added to the essence, because the operations
by which one thing is in
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some sense joined to another
proceed from the essence through powers distinct from it. Consequently nothing
achieves goodness absolutely unless it is complete in both its essential and its
accidental principles. Any perfection which a creature has from its essential
and accidental principles combined, God has in its entirety by his one simple
act of being."
Everything desires its
perfection, desires actualization. But the operations of all finite beings flow
from accidental potencies distinct from the being's essence. There are
accidental potencies or principles in every finite being which are actualized
through operations, not the substantial act of esse. Each created
being's substantial act, esse, actualizes the essence. Their accidental
potencies or powers actualize their esse concretely through operation.
The full actualization of those powers is the difference between any finite
being's qualified good (its substantial act) and its absolute good, between its
substantial act and the completion of accidental potencies. Thus, everything
exists for the sake of operation because everything naturally desires its full
perfection, because every potency is completed by act. Operation is the good of
every finite being. Since its substantial potency (essence) is actualized
through esse, its imperfection lies in the accidental powers yet to be
fully actualized. In human beings, these are above all the powers of the soul.
Thus, the reception and communication of the good through the accidental powers
of a finite being lead to the ultimate perfection of that being. The
substantial esse of creatures naturally and necessarily overflows into
operation and attains its ultimate perfection through activity and receptivity,
an outpouring which is not temporally distinct from the first instance that the
essence is actualized by its esse. Because it exists in act, every
finite being necessarily desires the good that it does not yet have and shares
the good which it does, at least in some limited fashion.
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We can now synthesize
Thomas' language about the inclination of form in ST, I, q. 5, a. 5, his
doctrine of the operative powers of created being as accidents, and his teaching
in DV q. 21, a. 5 on qualified and absolute goodness through an
application of his notion of substantial form as the intrinsic principle of
goodness in things as found in DV q. 21, a. 4. That article has a
solution to a problem that Boethius had raised in his de Hebdomadibus
involving the apparent contradiction between created goodness as an attribute of
all created being and the doctrine that God alone is good through himself and
not through participation. Boethius could not reconcile these doctrines since
he restricted participation to participation in accidents, leaving him with the
goodness of created beings, things that must be good by their very being since
they are attracted to the good (and like attracts like), as somehow good
independent of the first Good who is God. Thomas solves the problem by
expanding the doctrine of participation to all perfections, so that created
beings also participate being and goodness and not just accidents. Thomas'
solution in DV q. 21, a. 4 posits substantial form as an intrinsic form
for each substance and the principle of the whole being's substantial yet
participated goodness.
We can unfold a number of
implications of Thomas' thought on intrinsic form as the principle of goodness.
Form's inclination comes from its status as a principle for esse or the
ultimate act of things. Yet this inclination can also be explained by the
inherent goodness of form.
"If, therefore, the first
goodness is the effective cause of all goods, it must imprint its likeness upon
the things produced; and so each thing will be called good by reason of an
inherent form because of the likeness of the highest good implanted in it, and
also because of the first goodness taken as the exemplar and effective cause of
all created goodness."
Of course, form's status as
an inherent principle of goodness is partially due to the esse which
actualizes the form and the whole being through the form. But beyond that, form
bears a similitude of the highest good. It is a reflection of the divine wisdom
bringing intelligibility, unity, and order to the whole being. The divine
goodness shines forth through these and other characteristics that the whole
being shares in through the substantial form, so that these perfections manifest
goodness far beyond what sheer existence could display on its own. And as
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a principle for goodness,
form is a principle of diffusion, one concretized through operations that are
moving toward an end.
The dynamism of the
potencies of beings, especially the powers of the human soul, powers that are
inclined toward actualization, is explained through the diffusion of goodness
that flows through them from the substantial form. Thus, the goodness of the
substantial form is the immediate effective source or principle for the drive
towards fulfillment in accidental powers. Furthermore, even though the
substantial form is distinct from the potencies of the soul, and even though
substantial form already actualizes matter, there is a drive towards actuality
in the form that pours forth necessarily through external action. The operative
potencies of beings are not actualized solely through esse and
substantial form but through a synthesis of these acts and the accidental
accidents that we call operations. The goodness of the substantial form can
only manifest itself through operation, and its like can only be produced
through the mediation of accidental acts. There is a sense in which the
substantial form, even as it actualizes the substance, is incomplete without
operation. The whole being is ordered towards a perfection that it does not yet
possess, and yet it already has being and goodness that is active. The drive
for perfection and the self-expression of act converge.
The real distinction of
powers from their substance's essence and substantial form also helps to explain
the limitation on this diffusion of goodness immediately rooted in substantial
form. Goodness must pour forth in an accidental mode through certain powers in
particular modes, such as sensing or knowing. The status of accidental
potencies as really distinct powers that are unactualized without gradual and
continual interaction with the world means that the diffusion of goodness from
the substantial form through operations can only take on certain grades of
intensity based on the particular status of the power through which the being
operates. A being's knowledge that can be imparted or the intellectual and
sensual action a being exerts in the acquisition of knowledge is conditioned by
the status of its intellectual and sense powers, by the current extent of their
actualization. So the real distinction of powers from their substance's essence
and substantial form means that, on the created realm, the diffusion of goodness
will always be radically limited not just by the limitations of the form or the
essence (as form and essence determine esse) but by the limits of the
powers without which the being cannot operate. Goodness can only be expressed
in modes proper to the species, and even within species, there
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will be grades of limitation
in the intensity of goodness that can be poured forth through action, depending
on the relative perfection of the operative powers of the species' members.
On the other hand, the human
mode of this diffusion also gives us a glimpse of God's diffusion of goodness.
All created beings diffuse goodness by operation. All non-rational creatures do
so without the mediation of a voluntary power, while human beings perform some
operations through the mediation of a voluntary faculty and others without this
intermediary. Thus, the summit of the material hierarchy of being reveals a new
perfection, diffusion of goodness that is freely chosen. Later, we will see how
this harmonizes well with Aquinas' teaching on the divine nature and God's free
decision to create, so that God has this perfection that is manifested by the
human person. Yet this perfection is in the divinity in a more eminent manner,
so that all of his action ad extra is mediated by a free decision of his
will.
Overall, this synthesis of
the inclination of form, the real distinction of the potencies of finite beings
from their substantial form, the distinction between qualified and absolute
goodness, and intrinsic substantial forms as the principle of goodness for
finite beings reveals the close connection between the good as a productive
outpouring and the good as a final cause. The inclination of form is caused by
its goodness, and this grants the being's unactualized potencies a dynamism
toward absolute perfection, towards the final cause of absolute goodness. The
final cause of the good and the diffusive character of the good are what
underlie the great web of activity in the universe. Without intrinsic form, we
could not explain the efficient impetus in unactualized accidental powers, and
without the final cause, we would be left with operations that have no purpose.
Once again, we see a rich interplay of the good as end and the good as
diffusive, here implicit in Thomas' thought, thus overcoming Kretzmann's charge
that Thomas gives the attractive side of goodness exclusive expression.
We can further enrich our
understanding of Thomas' thought on bonum diffusivum sui through
theological texts dealing with supernatural communication, with the notion of
bonum communicativum sui. Thomas first raises this doctrine in the context
of his discussion on the Trinity in his commentary on Lombard's Sentences
(SS), as he asks whether there are many persons in God:
"On the contrary, as
Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, the good is communicative of
itself. But God is the highest good. Therefore he will communicate himself
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in the highest way. But he
does not communicate himself in the highest way with creatures, because they do
not receive his whole goodness. Therefore it must be that there is a perfect
communication, so that he may communicate his whole goodness to another. But
this cannot be in a diversity of essence. Therefore it must be that there are
several distinctions in the unity of the divine essence."
This is not a philosophical
proof for the Trinity. Thomas makes it clear that reason alone cannot attain
knowledge of the Trinity, opposing the tradition of Richard of St. Victor.
Rather, Thomas' faith is seeking understanding. Having attained knowledge of
the Trinity through faith, he recognizes a very fitting application of the
doctrine of the good. The communication of the divine essence from Father to
Son and from Father and Son to the Holy Spirit is an infinite
self-communication.
But it seems that the
philosopher can also posit an infinite communication in God, since by natural
reason we know him to be the highest good and can recognize the doctrine of the
good as self-communicative as well. Philosophy can posit God's willing and
understanding himself as an infinite self-communication, one remaining within
God. Thus, philosophy can accept the doctrine of the good as communicative of
itself and escape Clarke's dilemma, that the application of bonum diffusivum
sui to God leads the philosopher to posit a quasi-necessity of creation or
some knowledge of a plurality of persons in God.
Theology adds another
intra-divine communication, a sharing among the divine persons that are one
identical essence. So Thomas does not think that the good as self-communicative
requires an extrinsic communication, a sharing from one being to another. This
might seem to violate the very notion of the good as self-communicative, because
it seems to be a doctrine about the good's communicating itself to another
being. Thomas even seems to imply this when he speaks of the necessity of a
perfect communication that communicates the good with another. But the
"other" he is speaking of consists of divine persons sharing one divine essence,
an essence shared through a communication which is purely intrinsic. The
procession of Son and
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Holy Spirit from God is not
the procession of two esses but the sharing of a single, undivided
esse. Otherwise, the Trinity would consist of three Gods.
Thus, for God an intrinsic communication fulfills the requirements of the
doctrine of the good. Intrinsic communication can suffice for God because he
already possesses all goodness, or rather, because he is perfect goodness. But
all finite beings possess imperfect goodness, and are thus driven towards
extrinsic communication, towards sharing with and receiving from others, to
attain their own perfection.
As to our overall
understanding of the good as self-diffusive, this passage from the SS can
help us to recognize that the degree of communication is proportioned to the
degree of goodness. There are three aspects in this communication: the content
communicated, the ability to communicate, and the inclination to communicate.
In God, all of these are perfect. Notice that God is not described as choosing
to communicate himself perfectly, but simply does so. Because he is the highest
good, he must communicate all of his goodness (content). His
communication must be perfect (ability). He will
communicate in the highest way (inclination). The philosopher understands this
to consist of God's perfect communication of knowledge and love in himself,
which are identical with his being, while the theologian expands this
communication of being, knowledge, and love within God to an inter-personal
communication which nevertheless remains "inside" God's single esse.
Our SS passage gives
the general principle bonum est communicativum sui. This applies to all
beings. It is an attribute of every good, including every finite good. As one
moves up the hierarchy of being, the substantial goodness of things increases
accordingly, as the good and being are really the same. The closer one moves to
the ultimate good, the more a being resembles the first being, as the
participation of esse intensifies. So the higher the being, the greater
will be the content to communicate (the being's goodness), and the more it will
be able and inclined to communicate. Since this communication is extrinsic,
this means that relationality increases as one moves up the great chain of
being.
But this insight can be
taken further. The substantial perfections of finite beings is the same within
a species, but there are varying accidental perfections among individuals of the
same species, a variety which occurs, among other ways, through the degree of
operation. The more perfect an individual being is through accidental
perfection, the greater its sharing of goodness will be. The more accidental
perfection or goodness is possessed, the more content there will be
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to share. In intelligent
being, the possession of truth or the gradual perfection of a will would
increase the ability to communicate the good. Finally, the inclination to
communicate will intensify as one grows in the possession of perfection
(especially as one increase in love of neighbor), as one approaches the perfect
being whose (intrinsic) communication is necessary. So the communication of
goodness will more likely be richer and more frequent as one considers the
"accidental hierarchy of beings" within each species, the hierarchy of
individual beings according to their accidental perfection. Thus, relationality
varies within a species insofar as individual beings follow their inclination to
communicate the good. This means that relationality will be intimately
connected to the perfection of finite being.
We can see how a passage on
the trinitarian communication of the good reveals a great deal about the
philosophy of the good as communicative in Thomas. We can take similar
philosophical insights from two theological texts in Thomas' commentary on
Pseudo-Dionysius' Divine Names:
". . . it is clear in what
way knowledge of the secrets of God is communicated to others. For it would be
contrary to the nature of the divine goodness if it would retain its own
knowledge for itself so that it would communicate it to no one else at all,
since it is of the nature of the good that it communicate itself to others. And
therefore he [Dionysius] says that although the knowledge of the
supersubstantial God ought only be attributed to God, nevertheless, since God is
the good itself, it cannot be that he would not communicate with other existing
things.
Nor is it that he would
communicate his knowledge to others just as he knows himself. But he 'gathering
. . . benignly,' not out of necessity but freely, 'with proportional
illuminations,' that is, according to proportional illuminations, 'to anything
existing,' as if he is saying: the nature of his goodness is such that, keeping
to himself a certain manner of knowledge which is singular to him, he freely
communicates to inferior beings some manner of knowledge . . ."
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